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t 
Introduction 
This paper considers the way in which rural refugees who become self-settled 
are perceived and the relative disadvantages of this group when compared to 
urban refugees. Areas for further research and action to enable rural 
refugees to settle more rapidly and easily are suggested. 
Definitions 
'Urban refugees' refers to those in urban areas and 'rural refugees' to those 
in rural areas. Although the latter may have originated in urban areas (and 
vice versa), the greater majority of rural refugees are from rural areas. 
These populations can be divided into those who live in organised settlements 
or camps and those who, with or without external assistance, settle them-
selves . 
Numbers and Types1 of Refugees 
Estimates of numbers matter. If individual human beings are of equal importance, 
more refugees matter more than fewer refugees. To make such a simple point 
would be insulting were it not habitually ignored. It is easier to grasp 
and think about the problems of one refugee than of a group; or about a few 
hundred refugees than about half a million. 
It is difficult to estimate even orders of magnitude for the numbers of 
refugees in Africa. There are many sources of inaccuracy. Some government 
estimates exaggerate numbers through double counting, or to obtain additional 
relief supplies, or to score political points off a neighbouring state from 
which refugees originate. Other estimates undercount, especially where 
refugees try to remain unidentified, or where host countries do not wish to 
annoy their neighbours by admitting that there are any refugees at all. The 
greatest uncertainty concerns refugees, sometimes estimated as high as one 
million, from Guinea in Senegal, Ivory Coast and elsewhere in West Africa, and 
who usually do not appear in lists of refugees but who seem to be included in 
totals for the continent. Other difficulties include knowing how to separate 
economic or educational migrants from those who would qualify as refugees in 
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the strict legal sense; when refugees of long residence should cease to be 
counted; whether, and if so for how long, to include refugees who have 
repatriated; and whether to include displaced persons who are within their 
countries of origin. Moreover, the numbers of refugees in Africa change 
constantly with new influxes and repatriations. 
Two sets of figures can be distinguished: first, totals of estimates for 
known and recognised refugee situations; and second vaguer totals for the 
continent as a whole. The gap between these is considerable and appears to 
be widening. Thus adding the totals on a map published by UNHCR in Spring 1979 see appendix A) 
(UNHCR 1979a) gives 2,140,000 refugee^ /; but the figure cited by the OAU 
Secretary-General in an interview published at about the same time was the 
more usual 4 million (UNHCR 1979b:4) presumably including the unrecognised 
Guineans, the Zaireans and Angolans who have repatriated and who are in the 
process of resettling, and many others who are officially unacknowledged. 
The relative numbers of refugees in different categories are similarly 
uncertain. An estimate made by the writer in 1976, omitting refugees from 
Guinea, gave: 
Receiving 
assistance 
Not 
receiving 
assistance 
Total Percentage 
Urban refugees 4,000 10,000 14,000 1.2 
Rural refugees in 
organised settle-
ments and camps 
170,000 no.ooo1 280,000 24 
Self-settled rural 
refugees, not in 
organised settle-
ments or camps 
520,0002 350,000 870,000 75 
Totals 694,000 470,000 1,164,000 100 
1. But formerly assisted. 
2. Of these, some 480,000 were Angolans from Zaire, some of whom were 
receiving some marginal assistance. The total volume of assistance to 
this category was small compared with the volume to the others. 
With refugees from Guinea, the continental total might have been about 2 million. 
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Since 1976 these proportions have changed. The proportion of urban refugees, 
while still very small, has risen: one estimate in early 1979 was that they 
were about 90,000, or 4 per cent of refugees recognised at that time. The 
proportion and absolute numbers of self-settling refugees is much harder 
to estimate. If refugees repatriating from Zaire to Angola and from Angola 
to Zaire, and also refugees from Guinea, were excluded, the figure might 
be under one million. If, on the other hand, they are included, it might 
be over two million. A resolution of the PanAfrican Conference on Refugees 
held at Arusha in May 1979 recognised that "at present more than 60 per 
cent of Africa's rural refugees live outside organised settlement schemes." 
But the fact that it is difficult to say to within one million what that 
total should be is a first, and dramatic, indication of ignorance about 
self-settling refugees. 
WHY THE EYE DOES NOT SEE 
There are systemic reasons for ignorance about rural refugees generally 
and about self-settling refugees in particular. Together they interlock 
to sustain that ignorance. Some apply to ignorance of rural poverty 
generally on the part of urban-based professionals. Others are more specific 
to rural refugees. They include: 
urban and elite biases 
project bias 
dry season bias 
political and diplomatic factors 
remoteness 
low profile 
political impotence 
Let us consider them in turn. 
Urban and elite biases 
Urban and elite biases are reflected in writing about refugees. The plight 
of educated urban refugees, a tiny minority, are often reported and urban 
counselling services described. Visitors to Africa studying refugee 
problems go to urban centres first and may sometimes never leave them. 
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Christian Potholm, writing on "Africa's Persistent Problem" in 1976 
following 'kn extensive field trip dealing with refugee resettlement in East 
and Southern Africa", after passing mention of rural settlements, deals 
primarily with urban refugees citing individual cases in Mombasa, Lusaka, 
Gaborone, Kampala, Francistown, Addis Ababa, Mbabane, and Nairobi, and 
concluding that "the single most overlooked feature of the present refugee 
situation in Africa is the mental health of the individual refugee".1 These 
biases are less marked in the Christian Aid special renort on Refugees: Africa's the same, — Challenge (Knight 1978); but all/9 of the 22 photographs were taken in or 
near Nairobi, and the four case histories from Kenya were of refugees in observers 
the same urban and peri-urban area. Other /(e.g. Enahoro 1976) have taken 
a more balanced view, or have drawn attention to large neglected groups of 
self-settling refugees (e.g. Brittain 1976b);.but they have been the exception 
rather than the rule. Quick interviews, quick insights and quick stories 
can be obtained more efficiently, congenially and safely in urban centres 
than in remote rural areas. 
Pronounced urban and elite bias is also found in work with refugees. 
Lawyers and social workers predominate. These are the professions 
appropriate for dealing with individua-l cases like European refugees 
from Eastern Europe; they are, too, professions which can be recruited in the 
industrialised countries. Well-intentioned governments and international and 
voluntary agencies provide scholarships and assist further education- This 
requires urban staff and urban work. Moreover, urban refugees, often 
educated, articulate and politically active, demand attention and usually 
receive it: they queue for interviews daily, they protest, they do not go away. 
Understaffed as they are, UNHCR branch offices in Africa have to handle 
rural as well as urban problems; but the urban are immediate and take 
priority. Pressing demands trap staff in capital cities. To find 
time for rural visits is difficult. In any case, rural visits make yet 
more work. A prudent staff member may sense that zeal in uncovering new 
problems may not be greeted with unequivocal acclaim in the head office. A 
policy of "let sleeping dogs lie" is bound to be tempting for field staff 
in understaffed and overloaded agencies. Urban refugees come first; rural 
refugees remain a residual problem. 
Project bias 
Project bias has been marked in research and writing on rural refugees. 
1. The photographs, which fit badly with the text, are, however, of rural 
refugees. 
The literature on settlement schemes in tropical Africa is disproportionate to 
their importance. And a similar bias is found in work on organised refugee 
settlement compared with self-settlement. Several studies have analysed the 
experience with organised settlement (for example Yeld 1965 and c. 1968; Merusi 
1967; van. der Meeren 1969; Gosselin 1970; Chambers et al, 1971; Feldman c. 1971; 
Morsink c.1971; Trappe 1971; Sokiri 1972; Potten 1976). Such settlements 
have been visible, identifiable, accessible, organised as sources of data 
and statistics, and often provided with convenient accommodation 
for those undertaking research; agencies, too, have sometimes sponsored work. 
In comparison, self-settling refugees, although more numerous, have been 
neglected. Internal reports of agencies on self-settling refugees have not 
become part of common knowledge. The account of W.D. Grenfell (1967) of the 
work of the Kibentele Baptist Mission in Bas Zaire with Angolan refugees 
stands alone, to the best of my knowledge, as an account of relief work with 
mass influxes of self-settling refugees which has found its way into print. 
Again, to the best of my knowledge, the only available account by a social 
scientist of the problems and strategies of unassisted self-settling refugees 
1 is that of Art Hansen (1976, 1978) on Angolans in Zambia. 
The rural visits of officials have a similar project bias. There are exceptions, 
especially with investigations of fresh influxes, or where self-settling 
refugees are assisted. But organised camps and settlements receive the lion's 
share of the attention. They constitute known and accepted concentrations 
of refugees; and per capita expenditures in organised settlements are far 
higher than for sslf-settling refugees. The average allocations of UNHCR 
for 1976 were 40 times higher per head, at $20, for refugees in organised 
settlements than for that minority of self-settling refugees towards whom some 
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assistance was directed, and official visitors tend to go on supervisory 
visits to where most money is being spent. On organised settlements, there is 
also usually somewhere for the urban visitor to spend the night without 
undue discomfort and some source of not too unfamiliar food. Physical works 
in the form of roads, and buildings for headquarters, schools and clinics 
also make an intelligible point of contact for visitors unfamiliar with 
rural Africa. They can be inspected as evidence of achievement and as 
a diversion from dealing with individual cases and complaints. There is a 
building bias. In the words of some refugees, describing rare visitors "They 
only talk to the buildings" and "They come, and they sign the book, and they go". 
1. Currently at University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida 32611, USA. 
2. "Report on UNHCR Assistance Activities in 1974-75 and Proposed Voluntary 
Funds Programme and Budget for 1976", document A/AC. 96/516, UNHCK. 
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Dry season bias 
Dry season bias in rural visits distorts perceptions in another way. 
Poor people dependent on agriculture in tropical countries, are vulnerable 
to seasonal deprivation, especially during the rains and before harvest: 
at that time food is short and costly; the need to work on cultivation and 
Guinea worm disease, weeding is high; morbidity, especially the diarrhoeas, malaria/and skin 
infections, tend to peak; and malnutrition is most marked (Chambers et_ al_. 1979). 
Self-settling refugees are especially vulnerable. Grenfell has described 
the crisis when the International Red Cross closed down their feeding 
programme in Bas Zaire before the refugees had a harvest. He also wrote 
"Not surprisingly, there has been much malnutrition amongst the 
refugees. For three years, during the annual peak period, 
December and January, there would be many deaths, especially 
amongst the children. The reason was that the normal diet during 
these months just before harvest was on a starvation level; 
these were the months when food was the shortest, especially 
nutritionally valuable foods such as peanuts. In December 1964, 
the large hospital at Kimpese reported that more than 50 percent 
of refugee patients died." (Grenfell 1967:1068-9) 
But the rains are precisely the time when urban-based officials are least 
able or willing to travel. It is in the drier conditions which follow 
harvest and when things are better, that most impressions of rural conditions 
are derived. The worst times for self-settiing refugees are liable to go 
unobserved. 
Political and diplomatic factors 
Political and diplomatic factors sometimes have a bearing. Host governments 
may not wish to prejudice relations with a neighbouring country by recognising 
a group of refugees from it. Or, if there is a war of liberation or a 
guerrilla war, an area where refugees are self-settling may be forbidden 
to outside visitors. UNHCR staff may be inhibited by fear of damaging 
their relations with the government from pressing to find out more about 
a group of refugees. 
Remoteness 
Self-settling refugees are often in remote areas, inaccessible to 
those based in capital cities. Over the past decade, Angolans in Bas Zaire 
and in Zambia, Jehovah's Witnesses variously in Zambia, Tanzania and Malawi, 
Barundi in Tanzania, Eritreans in the Sudan, Sudanese in Gambela Awraja in 
Ethiopia, and most recently Ugandans in the South Sudan, are examples of 
large groups in border regions which are difficult to reach from the capital 
city of the host country. 
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Low profile 
Self-settling refugees often have a low profile. Art Hansen, 
starting his•fieldwork in a border area of Zambia, did not at first know 
that there were any refugees there, although he subsequently estimated 
them as 25 to. 35 percent of the population; he believed that they were 
afraid he would report them to the Government (Hansen 1976: 4-5 and 1978:8,15). 
C.K. Omari, in his analysis of rural development in Kibondo District in 
the Kigoma Region of Tanzania, deals with migration but does not mention 
refugees at any stage (Omari 1976:115-151). Yet his fieldwork was carried 
out in 1973; there was a major influx into the Kigoma Region from Burundi 
in 1972; Kibondo is in northern Kogoma bordering Burundi, a district in 
which one might expect many of the refugees to be concentrated; and an 
estimate in 1976 put the number of self-settling Barundi refugees in the 
region at 75,000. In such cases self-settling refugees in border areas 
may be unseen because they wish to keep out of sight, fearing harrassment, 
repatriation, or being moved. Or it may be that, like poor people all 
over the world, they are unseen because they live in the remoter, less fertile 
areas further from the roads, do not come forward to meet visitors, and 
maintain a low profile to keep out of trouble. 
Political impotence 
Self-settling refugees are usually politically impotent. Remote, 
unorganised, deprived of their more educated members who go off to towns, 
secondary schools and scholarships, they rarely establish contact with 
assistance agencies on their own initiative. They cannot bang on office 
doors, speak to reporters, obtain television coverage or present an 
embarrassing problem to the richer countries of the world. They are out of 
sight, out of hearing, and conveniently out of mind. The refugees from 
Czechoslavakia in 1968, from Chile after 1973 and from Vietnam in 1979 
have been blazoned across the headlines of the world's press; and many 
have been accepted into the industrialised countries as individual cases 
which receive close personal assistance. But Guineans in Senegal and 
Ivory Coast, Equatorial Guineans in Gabon and Cameroun, Angolans in Zaire, 
Zaireans in Angola and Ugandans in the South Sudan have not moved the 
conscience of the rich world in the same way. Dying in rural Africa is 
less dramatic than drowning in the South China sea. 
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MYTHS ABOUT SETTLEMENT 
The combined effects of these biases and factors have been not merely 
ignorance but also its companion, myth. Concerning refugee settlement two 
myths are liable to mislead. Both have enough substance to justify them 
in some cases; but for different reasons they appeal to observers who then 
apply them across the board to situations where they are not true. Moreover, 
both are less true at the end of the 1970s than they were ten years earlier. 
They are first, concerning organised settlement, the myth of the "total 
institution", and second, concerning self-settlement, the myth of "spontaneous 
integration". 
Total institutions 
The idea of the total institution appeals to social scientists who have 
generally taken a negative view of organised settlement. This has some of 
its roots in research in East Africa in the latter 1960s when many agri-
cultural settlement schemes were having teething troubles; mistakes had 
been made and social scientists duly observed them and wrote about them. 
Researchers concentrated on medium-sized' settlements which were convenient 
to study, which had high staff to refugee or settler ratios, and where 
often one manager or commandant dominated. Along with prisons, boarding 
schools, hospitals, and asylums, organised settlements could be seen as 
a new species in the genus "total institution", (Goffman 1962; Moris 1967; 
Gosselin 1970; Sokiri 1972). Now it is true that there were cases of abuse 
in organised refugee settlement through dictatorial management, restrictions 
on movement, petty corruption and bureaucratic harrassment. It is also true 
that some refugees developed dependent attitudes and were reluctant to help 
themselves, as occurred with Rwandese at Mwese in Tanzania, one of the earliest 
refugee settlements. And wherever there were security problems so that a 
settlement had something of the character of a camp, as with Mozambiquan 
settlements in Southern Tanzania, the total institution analogy had some 
application. But many of the lessons of "the 1960s, such as the value of 
giving families a high degree of autonomy on land from which they could 
provision themselves, had been learnt by the early 1970s and were incorporated 
in refugee settlements. The settlement successes of the 1970s such as Etsha 
in Botswana and Katumba and Ulyankulu in Tanzania were in no significant 
sense total institutions. In the case of the latter two, each with over 
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50,000 refugees, size and few staff would have ruled out a dictatorial 
regime even had one been sought. The problems of these settlements were more 
economic^" than those of legal protection for refugees in a total institution. 
In sum, in the latter 1970s, although much remains to be desired, and rural 
refugees in organised settlements have been neglected compared with urban 
refugees, their management and situation have improved; and their side of a 
comparison with self-settlement would show up better than it would have 
done ten years earlier. 
Spontaneous Integration 
The idea of spontaneous integration appeals to officials engaged in 
refugee work who are faced with large numbers of dispersed and inaccessible 
refugees. In contrast with the pejorative "total institution", "spontaneous 
integration", as labels go, is benign. According to the Starter Oxford 
Dictionary, "spontaneous" means "Arising, proceeding, or acting entirely 
from natural impulse, without any external stimulus or constraint; voluntary;" 
and "integration" means "the making up of a whole by adding together or 
combining the separate parts or elements; a making whole or entire". The t 
implications are reassuring. Refugees about whom little is known and for 
whom little or nothing is done, have been allowed to act from natural 
impulse, without external stimulus or constraint, to make up a whole with 
the local population. 
The view of self-settlement implied in "spontaneous integration" runs as 
follows. Self-settling refugees cross borders and resettle with ethnic 
kin. They are welcomed, fed and cared for as part of traditional hospitality. 
They are given land to cultivate. They quickly re-establish themselves. 
They are much better off than those rural refugees who are rounded up and 
herded off to camps and settlements. 
1. Ulyankulu had to be divided up and part of the population resettled. 
Etsha took some time to achieve adequate incomes. Five years after 
their settlement, the Hambukushu refugees at Etsha still had average 
incomes less than one half of the next poorest rural group surveyed, 
who were employees of freehold farmers, and only a little over one 
third of the average for all rural households (Republic of Botswana 
1976). But this may reflect the very low base from which they started, 
and the history of the settlement has been one of growing prosperity 
(Potten 1976). 
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To be sure, there have been cases which have looked like this. Cato Aall 
described how refugees from Mozambique entering Zambia in 1965 intended to stay 
with their relatives and friends, were not regarded as aliens but as 
unfortunate fellow men, and had good relations with the local population 
who were of the same tribe (Aall 1967: 29-32). William Zartman wrote of 
refugees from Guinea-Bissau in Senegal, that the host population 
"speak the same language, lead the same communal life, and sometimes 
even have shared .the same fields which lay across the border. 
The affinity between the inhabitants and the refugees has proved 
so strong that, in many cases, the local population has shared 
everything with the refugees including lodging, tools, seeds, and 
food stocks" (Zartman 1970:151) 
Rachel Yeld, after describing some of the problems with organised settlements 
for Rwandese refugees in Tanzania, went on to contrast them with those 
"refugees who did not pass through one of the main centres but who 
established themselves as individual families or in small groups 
among the local population. Without receiving any official 
government assistance, they were in many cases able, by cultivating 
for food or money for the local people, to become self-sufficient 
within one season on land acquired through local custom." (Yeld 1965). 
One may wonder however about the detail and the reality. Refugee populations 
are not homogenous. Some - those who manage to come with some assets, or 
who have strong ties of kinship with hosts, or who have strong families -
may be a minority, albeit a visible minority, who do manage to establish 
themselves. Hansen has pointed out that some could not. "Those refugees 
in camps are those who have failed to find kinsmen or who could not 
generate enough social and local political support" (1976:11). But it is 
not just a question of the poorer and weaker refugees. Whole populations 
may suffer in ways which refute the myth. Neither moving a short distance, 
nor settling among ethnic kin, necessarily assures acceptable self-settlement: 
the Barundi refugees who crossed into South Kivu in 1972, fleeing from 
massacre, were to experience years of deprivation in an area already densely 
populated, although the distance they travelled was short; and the Bakongo 
refugees who crossed from Angola to Bas Zaire from 1961 onwards settled 
among ethnic kin but suffered badly. 
This case of half a million Angolans in Bas Zaire shows how dangerous 
ignorance and myth can be. Miscalculations by relief agencies withdrawing 
support had severe effects (Grenfell 1967). There were problems of perception 
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on the official side. The High Commissioner for Refugees reported to his 
Executive Committee in 1969 
"An extensive mission undertaken in 1968 by the UNHCR Representative 
in the Congo along the southwestern border of the country revealed 
that the condition of the refugees from Angola ... is much less 
satisfactory than had been believed. He also discovered several 
smaller groups of Angolans whose existence had not been known to 
UNHCR until that time" (Holborn 1975:1059, citing Ex. Com., Sept. 
1969, A/AC.96/414, Ann.1:4-5) 
A discernable deterioration was reported in living conditions in areas where 
refugees had been self-settled for several years. If more had been known, 
and known earlier, much more might have been done. The reassuring 
myth of "spontaneous integration" can always seem to dismiss the problem, 
and to suggest it would be better not to interfere. But problems, if they 
exist, are not solved by a choice of words. 
THE REALITY OF SELF-SETTLEMENT 
To write about the reality beneath the appearance of self-settlement is 
difficult because little detailed investigation is known to have been reported. 
There is, of course, a danger of selective use of even what is known, and 
of the generation of new myths. An examination of evidence, does, however 
suggest seven points, all deserving more detailed and widespread investigation, 
but all suggesting serious problems in self-settlement. They are: 
•• instant impoverishment 
- mixed reception 
- cheap labour, dear food 
- poor access to land 
- political and legal vulnerability 
- the first to suffer, the last to gain 
- costs to the poorer hosts 
Instant impoverishment 
Most rural refugees arrive instantly impoverished. Their condition varies; 
but quietly skipping a few miles across a border to set up with help from 
relatives can only apply to a small minority of current refugees in Africa. 
More commonly there is traumatic flight, a loss of family (either dead, or 
left behind), exhaustion and shortage of food. Refugees lose land, livestock 
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and possessions. If they have brought any cash savings with them, these are 
devalued or worthless. In the camp of Wad-el-Hileiwu in the Sudan, at one 
time in 1975 shortly after their arrival, refugees could get only 10 piastres 
for an Ethiopian dollar as against an official rate of 25, losing 60 per cent 
of the value of their savings. In remote rural areas, in time of war, as in 
The Angola-Zambia case, the losses may be total. Hansen describes these: 
"Refugees are poorer than normal migrants for several reasons. 
Angolan money is worthless- outside the colony, so any monetary 
savings become worthless. Earlier immigrants from Angola would 
exchange their money at the border with people who traded in 
Angola, but the war stopped trade. The other mode of storing 
large amounts of capital is cattle. Earlier immigrants either sold 
their cattle before leaving or drove them to Zambia. Refugees 
either lost their cattle to various soldiers before leaving or 
abandoned their cattle. No-one was left to buy them, and it was 
dangerous to drive cattle because the Portuguese were bombing 
anyone they saw in the free fire zones. Only the refugees who 
fled in the first days of fighting were able to save some of their 
invested capital. Later refugees could only carry smaller less 
valuable items (clothes, blankets, tobacco, axe heads, etc.) 
.By the time refugees reached their Zambian relatives, their food 
supplies were usually exhausted, as were the refugees themselves." 
(1978:12-13) 
What was true for Angolans fleeing from the Portuguese may be true for many 
others currently fleeing from oppression in Southern Africa. 
One effect of this instant impoverishment and lack of assets is to aggravate 
the difficulties of becoming reestablished. Those who come with some capital 
have the best chance of being able to secure themselves with adequate liveli-
hoods. Hansen (personal communication) has contrasted the advantages of a 
refugee family which at the outset could buy a field of cassava and thus 
not have to work for food, allowing them to devote themselves wholly to 
house-building and clearing their own fields, and a family which had to work 
for others from the start in order to get food to survive. 
Mixed reception 
The quality and duration of hospitality varies. Traditional hospitality 
has been an important factor in mitigating suffering. The welcome 
accorded to refugees and the sacrifices made for them can be impressive. 
In March 1975, before other relief arrived, the traders of Gedaref in the Sudan 
raised £7,000 to support the large influx of refugees from Eritrea. In 1976 
the Sudan Government clerk at Jikao on the Ethiopian border was feeding 
Ethiopian refugees out of his meagre salary. Poor people are often the most 
generous and the greatest sacrifices for refugees may have been made by 
those who have least themselves. But there is another side to the coin. 
At an anecdotal level, one hears about refugees robbed by officials and 
other thieves. Angolans were robbed on returning from Zaire. Theft was 
reportedly common among South Sudanese Nuer who had moved into the Gambela 
area of Ethiopia in 1975, although they were among fellow Nuer. One 
detailed account comes from Colin Turnbull who, as an anthropologist, 
was living with the Ik in Northern Uganda at a time when refugees were 
fleeing from the South Sudan 
"... we had a steady trickle of refugees coming through Kidepo, 
mostly Didinga herders. Those who were at the end of their tether, 
ill or injured, and with no wealth, were sent on down to Kaabong, 
where, they were told, they would be helped if they could survive 
the final two-day walk. But those who had wealth of any kind were 
ushered with great protestations of friendship into a kind of 
refugee camp that the Ik thought up themselves. It was at the 
lower end of Kauar's long, narrow village, just across from me. 
The village even constructed a boma to contain the Didinga cattle 
and goats, but it was placed at the other end, away from the 
Didinga and convenient to the hungry Ik. Didinga who were thus 
welcomed never lasted long before they too joined the stream of 
refugees flowing on down to Kaabong, where in fact there was a 
generous and well-conceived working system for resettling them as 
farmers near Debesien." (Turnbull 1973:122) 
This combination of welcome and theft may be exceptional; certainly the 
Ik, as portrayed by Turnbull, were unusually unscrupulous and desperate. 
But one is, all the same, left wondering about what happens in hundreds of 
other situations, especially but not only where there are ethnic differences. 
Cheap labour, dear food 
The terms of trade for labour against food are crucial. Their labour is 
often all that refugees have to sell; but refugee influxes turn the terms of 
trade dramatically against it: wages are driven down, and food prices up. 
In the refugee concentration at Wad-el-Hiliewu in the Sudan in 1975, the 
Eritrean refugee influx drove the daily wage rate down from 50 piastres 
to 35. In South Kivu daily casual wages in the mid-1970s, when many poor 
refugees who had to rely on wage labour, remained constant in money terms 
at a time of sharp inflation in food prices. Hansen found in Zambia in 
an area of self-settlement that 
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"Refugees who earn all their food through exchanging their labor 
live a truly hand to mouth existence. Without any guaranteed 
large food supply to" begin with, they must immediately set to work 
to earn that day's food. Needing food every day they must acquire 
it in a semi- or completely processed form. They do not have 
the three to five day grace period that is needed to completely 
process cassava." (Hansen 1976:16-17) 
They then got fewer calories for their work. At the time of his research, 
1970-72, one day's work would only earn two days' supply of processed 
cassava, and a further day was required to earn enough fish and relish for 
two days' food. Thus 
"A husband and wife, if both worked a normal work day every day, 
would earn only enough to feed themselves. If they had any 
children or other dependents who could not work, or if one of the 
two people became ill and could not work, they had to eat less 
than the normal quantity of food and a less desirable relish." 
(ibid:17) 
As he puts it, if refugees have to resort to this means of obtaining 
cassava "they will only slowly shed their poverty and lose their visible 
signs of recent immigration". (ibid:16). Indeed, the land available 
for cultivation by refugees was six or seven miles from the village; the 
struggle to become established through clearing and cultivating their own 
fields must have been exceptionally hard, if indeed it could be achieved at 
all. 
Poor access to land 
Land may not be available, or only too little, or only poor land, 
or only land distant from settlement, or only on a insecure basis; or 
combinations of these. Land tenure in Africa is changing rapidly under 
the pressures of legislation, administration, economic development and 
population growth. Sociologists and social anthropologists' perceptions 
lag, given their gestation periods between research, writing, and reading 
and teaching based on the research. Buying and selling the usufruct of 
the land, especially where there is population pressure, is increasingly the 
norm. Secure access tor land for refugees on traditional terms must be 
declining. In any case, it has probably been exaggerated. Five examples 
can illustrate the difficulty of secure establishment upon adequate land 
outside organised settlements: 
- in Uganda, Rwandese refugees who had been farming under arrangements they 
had made on their own were displaced by their landlords when in 1975, 
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a Land Reform Bill was being considered. The landlords feared that a 
policy of land to the tiller would rob them of their rights if their 
tenants remained. The refugees ceased to be rural and presented them-
selves as individual urban cases at the UNHCR branch Office in Kampala. 
Bas 
- In/Zaire, according to Grenfell, the plots of land given to Angolan 
refugees were far too small for many of them (1967:1069) 
- In South Kivu in Zaire, some Barundi refugees who managed to rent 
land were driven off either when they had completed the hard work of land 
preparation, or when their crops were growing, the benefits falling to the 
landholder and the refugee losing all; and very few obtained access to 
land adequate for a family livelihood. 
- In Tanzania, an estimated 75,000 Barundi refugees settled themselves 
in 1972 in the Kigoma Region. But as villagization took place in rural 
Tanzania two to three years later, over ten thousand of them were 
displaced and became a major new influx into the organised settlements of 
Ulyankulu and Katumba. 
- In Zambia, some of the refugees who had settled near the Angola border 
some 4 to 6 years earlier were transferred by the Government to the 
organised settlement at Meheba. 
Political and legal vulnerability 
Self-settled refugees are vulnerable politically and legally. They are 
easy victims for blackmail, exploitation and expropriation. They can 
be threatened variously with repatriation and arrest. If they begin to 
achieve modest economic success, they may become hypervulnerable to harrassment 
or expropriation. They may be kept poor not just by their initial poverty, 
low wages,lack of work, and lack of food, but also by petty persecution and 
lack of security. They then keep a low profile and avoid investment. Tree 
crops (coffee, cashew, etc.) have been grown on organised settlements. 
Self-settled refugees are much less likely to plant them. Quite apart from 
lack of capital, and difficulty foregoing food crops while the tree crops 
grow, they areunlikely to have secure enough access to land, or to wish to 
draw attention to themselves, or to be prepared to risk losing all through 
arbitrary expropriation. 
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First to suffer, last to gain 
Poor and weak rural people are the first to suffer and the last to gain. 
Rural refugees, starting impoverished and often in a weak position vis-a-vis 
government bureaucracy, are especially likely to suffer. The land they can 
cultivate will be the most distant or the least fertile or both. Many 
may need credit, but it may be on worse terms than for those who have 
more assets; although not for a refugee situation, Margaret Haswell has 
found in a Gambian village that the poor paid much higher interest rates -
up to 157 percent, than those with assets in livestock, as low as 49 per 
cent (Haswell 1975: ). Self-settling refugees are also unlikely, short 
of special interventions, to have equal access to education for their 
children. And in any famine they will be the first to starve. 
Costs to the poorer hosts 
The costs to host populations of supporting refugees are easily overlooked. 
Those who are wealthy and powerful may often benefit. A notable in the Sudan 
who welcomed Eritreans was unlikely to regret the presence of cheap labour, 
fed moreover by WFP, since he needed 250 labourers for weeding and harvesting. 
In another instance, in South Kivu, two chefs de collectivite vied with each 
other to welcome a settlement for refugees whose numbers would enhance their 
importance and perhaps bring a clinic and a school in their wake. Again, 
if food is sold to refugees, those - the wealthier - with food to sell 
gain from high prices.. Cheap labour and dear food help the "haves". 
They also harm the "have-nots". The poorer people in a host population 
often lose. Refugees who drive down the terms of trade for labour against food 
impoverish those who rely partly or entirely on labouring for their livelihoods. 
When the International Red eross closed down their work of feeding refugees 
in Bas Zaire in 1962 before the first harvest was due, "... food supplies 
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for the whole area were very low. This and rising prices affected the local 
population as well; the latter could not afford to buy ..." (Grenfell 1967:1064). 
When Mozambiquan refugees arrived in the East Province of Zambia in 1965, 
in an area which was "almost regularly stricken by famine" (Aall 1967:29), it 
is scarcely surprising that local people as well as refugees presented 
themselves for food rations; those who have little food and share it with 
others also starve, and starve because of their generosity. When it was 
noted, after the Barundi influx into South Kivu, that the children of local 
people as well as of refugees had kwashiokor, this may not have reflected 
their previous poverty as much as the effects of the refugees' presence: 
they may have had kwashiokor because of the refugees. The cruellest cut of 
all is if refugees can afford to work for starvation wages because they 
have free food, and the poor among the hosts cannot. 
Pressure on land can also hurt the hosts. For Gambela in Ethiopia 
Anthony Ellman observed that 
"in the absence of other sources of assistance, the refugees 
have been forced to depend on the local farmers for food in the 
first year, and have also reduced the total amount of high quality 
land and water resources available" (Ellman, 1972:10) 
apparently a zero sum situation in which many of the hosts may be presumed 
to have lost. $ore clearly, this was the case in Bas Zaire. Pressure on the 
land contributed to deteriorating agricultural conditions in Kongo Central, 
and there was a discernable worsening in the living conditions of both 
refugees and the indigenous population. (Holborn 1975:1059-1060). 
The pattern must not be overdrawn. There may be cases where almost all of 
a host population gains, for example if land is abundant and if refugees 
initially provide cheap labour which enables the hosts to cultivate larger 
areas. With assisted self-settlement, improved services may also benefit 
all the hosts. But generally, unless there are special interventions, the 
poorer people in a host population are, at the least, at risk and may be 
seriously impoverished. 
-18-
THE FUTURE 
Trends 
The practical implications of this analysis depend on trends and should 
look to the future. Numbers of refugees are difficult to foresee. Estimated 
numbers of officially acknowledged refugees in Africa have been rising from 
400,000 in 1964 and 700,000 in 1967 (Hamrell 1967:14-15) to 1.2 million in 
1976, and 2.1 million in early 
1979 (UNHCR 1979a). Whether the actual numbers of refugees, including those 
not recognised, has been rising is less clear. Future officially 
acknowledged numbers will depend on repatriations, on political developments, 
especially in Southern Africa and in the larger African countries, and on 
whether diplomatic pressures, for example through the 0AU or from the UN system, 
will lead to acknowledgement of refugees who at present officially do not 
exist. However, short of major international disasters, three trends can 
be foreseen in the composition and problems of refugees. 
The first is a rise in levels of education and aspiration in refugees. 
From 1960 to 1972, primary school enrolments in Africa doubled, from 19 
million to 37 million (ECA 1978:70), representing an annual growth rate 
of 5.7 per cent. But over the same period, the rate of growth in secondary 
and tertiary enrolments was about 10 per cent each (Personal communication, 
C. Colclough). In 1975 over half the primary school age population was 
in school, and the percentage had in many countries been rising fast. 
Even if these rates of growth slow, the proportion of the adult population 
of Africa that is educated will continue to grow, and with it the proportion 
of refugees who are educated and who have higher aspirations and expectations . 
The second is increasing difficulty for refugees seeking access to land. 
The population of Africa South of the Sahara is rising at over 2.5 per 
cent per annum (World Bank 1978:51). An FAO estimate has put increases 
in rural populations, after allowing for rural-urban migration, for the 
quarter century 1975-2000, as follows: 
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Botswana 
Ethiopia 
Ghana 
65 per cent 
70 
53 
Kenya 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
109 
82 
96 
Sudan 
Tanzania 
Upper Volta 
Zaire 
89 
107 
67 
44 
Zambia 44 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia 100 
Unoccupied land is being, and will continue to be, very rapidly colonised 
(Mbithi and Barnes 1975; Eckholm 1976). Most land tenure systems are 
shifting towards less communal and more commercial relationships. Land 
pressure and the market for land can hardly fail to make obtaining land for 
refugee settlement, whether organised or self-settlement, increasingly 
difficult. 
The third is a rise in the proportion of refugees who will wish to define 
themselves as individual urban cases. This follows partly from the explosion 
in education and aspiration, partly from difficulty obtaining land, and 
partly from very rapid urbanisation. In many African countries, the urban 
population has been projected to rise by at least threefold in the quarter 
century 1975-2000. Refugees who are urban in origin can be expected to seek 
to be urban in destination. 
Action and Research 
The three trends of rising education and aspirations, greater difficulty 
in obtaining land, and more refugees wanting to go to urban areas, implies 
closer administration and higher costs in refugee programmes. The options 
will differ case by case. If refugees of rural origin are not to become 
urban, and if they are not to be placed in camps, then there are three 
main options: 
(i) organised settlement. If adequate land can be found, this may often 
be the best option in the 1980s; but land for organised settlement 
is becoming scarcer. 
(ii) unassisted self-settlement. On the evidence presented in this paper, 
this appears a harsh alternative, especially for the poorer and weaker 
refugees, unless the alternatives are very unattractive for them. 
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However, their wishes should be weighed; and migrant labouring, for 
example, may sometimes provide an adequate livelihood, as perhaps 
for some refugees in Kassala Province in the Sudan. More has to be 
found out about the costs and benefits of different strategies for 
unassisted self-settlement for different categories of refugees. 
C'iii) assisted self-settlement. It may well emerge that for many rural 
refugees, this will present the best combination of the desirable 
and the feasible. 
For more extensive and effective assisted self-
settlement deliberate steps are required to offset the systemic biases in 
the•perceptions of staff which prevent them from seeing the deprivation of 
rural refugees. Perhaps the most efficient method is to require staff 
themselves to undertake research. UNECR, for example, might arrange mini-
sabbaticals , preferably during the rains when things are most difficult for 
the poorer people, for its staff to undertake investigations of self-settling 
refugees on the spot. This could be supplemented by sensitive social 
science research, where possible including refugees themselves, in a range 
of representative locations. Comparative knowledge would be useful on 
the impoverishment of refugees, sources of food and the terms on which it is 
obtained, welcome and hospitality, wage rates and opportunities to work, 
access to land, indicators of deprivation (body weights, birthweights, 
sickness, malnutrition, mortality, morbidity), social relations, migration, 
effects on the family, attitudes to and relations with authorities, and 
above all pathways to becoming securely established, and how these can be 
supported, and how and why some refugees remain impoverished and insecure, 
and how that could be overcome. The objective should be to avoid myths, 
either positive or negative, and to work towards a clearer understanding of 
things as they are. 
This should be complemented by efforts to learn from past and present 
experience with assisted self-settlement. Many interventions have been 
undertaken and are well known, but systematic evaluation has not often 
been carried out. Monitoring and evaluation would be useful for interventions 
such as issues of food, ration cards, cooking equipment and clothing; 
providing tools and seeds; obtaining land; identifying craftsmen and other 
specialists and giving them their tools of trade and helping them to get 
established; and strengthening health and education services. Special 
attention might be paid to the detailed effects of food supplies and of 
terminating them, and to methods for obtaining secure and adequate access 
to land. UNHCR's experience in South Kivu could be a source of useful 
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lessons here. Effects of interventions on the poorer people in host 
populations also deserves investigation. Finally, further comparisons would 
be useful between refugees with assisted self-settlement and refugees in 
organised, settlements. 
More attention to assisted self-settlement implies a more staff-intensive 
and more development-oriented approach than has been common in the past. 
Assisting the establishment of poor refugees among an existing rural 
population, especially where there is a shortage of land, requires fine-
pointing, which in turn requires funds, and perceptive and imaginative 
staff. It would be surprising, given the poverty-orientation of donor 
agencies, if funds could not be found to support such approaches. It is 
less likely to be finance, and more likely to be lack of suitable staff, 
that is an impediment. Action can be suggested on two fronts." 
First, implementing the resolution of the Panafrican conference on Refugees 
in Africa: 
"studies of the social, educational and economic situation of rural 
refugees outside organised settlement schemes should be undertaken 
by governments in cooperation with the appropriate international 
and non-governmental organizations with a view to providing 
governments and international organizations with the basic 
information necessary to formulate programmes of assistance and 
to securing the necessary financial support to implement such 
programmes" 
Second, recruiting and training more staff who will have eyes to see, and 
the will to act. 
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Appendix A Numbers of Refugees in Africa, February 1979 
Algeria 52,000 
Angola 180,000 
Botswana 19,000 
Burundi 50,000 
Djibouti (Republic of) 20,000 
Ethiopia . 11,000 
Gabon 60,000 
Kenya 6,000 
Morocco 500 
Mozambique 100,000 
Rwanda 7,500 
Senegal 5,000 
Somalia 500,000 
Sudan 250,000 
Tanzania 167,000 
Uganda 112,000 
Zaire 530,000 
Zambia 70,000 
2,140,000 
Source: UNHCR 1979a:6-7, which qualifies these statistics as follows 
"UNHCR does not have complete statistics on refugees 
and displaced persons in the world and uses those provided 
to UNHCR by governments. The figures which follow concern 
only refugees in countries where they number at least 500 
and where their situation has been brought to the attention 
of UNHCR." 
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